“Kill ‘em and Sort it Out Later:” Signature Drone Strikes
and International Humanitarian Law by Benson, Kristina
Global Business & Development Law Journal
Volume 27
Issue 1 Pacific McGeorge Global Business &
Development Law
Article 2
1-1-2014
“Kill ‘em and Sort it Out Later:” Signature Drone
Strikes and International Humanitarian Law
Kristina Benson
University of California, Los Angeles
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/globe
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Global Business & Development Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
mgibney@pacific.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kristina Benson, “Kill ‘em and Sort it Out Later:” Signature Drone Strikes and International Humanitarian Law, 27 Pac. McGeorge
Global Bus. & Dev. L.J. 17 (2014).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/globe/vol27/iss1/2
02_BENSON.EICREVIEW.FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/17/2014 3:12 PM 
 
17 
“Kill ‘em and Sort it Out Later:” Signature Drone Strikes 
and International Humanitarian Law 
Kristina Benson* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 17 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY: SIGNATURE STRIKES AND THE WAR ON TERROR ........... 19 
III. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: WHEN IT APPLIES, AND WHAT 
IT MEANS IN A POST-9/11 WORLD ................................................................. 23 
 A.  Yemen ...................................................................................................... 23 
 B.  Pakistan ................................................................................................... 25 
 C.  Afghanistan .............................................................................................. 26 
IV. IHL APPLIES TO SIGNATURE STRIKES IN AFGHANISTAN, YEMEN, AND 
PAKISTAN ....................................................................................................... 27 
V. SIGNATURE STRIKES AND “OBSERVED PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOR:” A 
LEGAL (OR USEFUL) PROXY FOR “DIRECT PARTICIPATION?” ....................... 29 
VI. DO SIGNATURE STRIKES VIOLATE THE PRINCIPLE OF 
PROPORTIONALITY? ....................................................................................... 36 
VII. ARGUMENTS FOR DRONES: “ACCURACY,” “PRECISION,”  
 AND OPERATORS’ MENTAL HEALTH ............................................................. 43 
VIII. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS ..................................................................... 49 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As of this writing, drone strikes have become a critical tool in the War on 
Terror.1 Used regularly in Afghanistan, Yemen, and Pakistan,2 they have 
 
* Kristina Benson, PhD candidate in Islamic Studies at the University of California, Los Angeles. This 
paper benefitted tremendously from the comments and input of Assistant Professor Aslı Ü Bâli, and the support 
of Professor Emerita Sondra Hale, and Distinguished Professor Khaled Abou el Fadl. Sincere appreciation to 
UCLA School of Law, who generously permitted my use of their facilities, and to the staff at The Globe, who 
went above and beyond the call of duty in helping prepare this article for publication. 
1. Drones, REPRIEVE, http://www.reprieve.org.uk/investigations/drones/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2013); 
Drone Strikes Kill, Maim and Traumatize Too Many Civilians, U.S. Study Says, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/ 
2012/09/25/world/asia/pakistan-us-drone-strikes/index.html?iref=allsearch (last updated Sept. 25, 2012, 8:33 
PM). 
2. Cora Currier, Everything We Know So Far About Drone Strikes, PROPUBLICA (Feb. 5, 2013, 10:50 
AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/everything-we-know-so-far-about-drone-strikes. 
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additionally carried out occasional missions in the Philippines,3 Iraq, Libya, and 
Somalia,4 and have even been occasionally used in U.S. airspace to provide 
surveillance functions on domestic populations.5 Although the drone program 
remains officially classified, a mix of on-the-ground reporting, eye-witness 
accounts, and leaked information allow us to make tentative assessments of the 
legality of signature drone strike protocol, both in theory and as it has been 
executed. The head of the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) developed 
“signature strikes,” and the CIA made critical decisions about the development 
and use of the drone program during President George W. Bush’s second 
presidential term.6 Such strikes target individuals due solely to their observed 
pattern of behavior, or “signature,”7 and have been deployed with the most 
frequency in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (“FATA”) of Pakistan, 
Yemen, and Afghanistan.8 
In spite of President Obama’s insistence that such strikes do not cause a 
“huge number of civilian casualties,”9 there is mounting evidence that signature 
strike protocol does a poor job of distinguishing between combatants and non-
combatants, resulting in a disproportionate amount of civilian casualties and the 
infliction of grave psychological trauma on civilians in a given strike zone.10 
Clive Stafford Smith, director of the anti-drone activist group Reprieve, put it as 
follows, “[a]n entire region [of Pakistan] is being terrorized by the constant threat 
of death from the skies . . . Their way of life is collapsing: kids are too terrified to 
go to school, adults are afraid to attend weddings, funerals, business meetings, or 
anything that involves gathering in groups.”11 
 
3. Akbar Ahmed & Frankie Martin, Deadly Drone Strike on Muslims in the Southern Philippines (Mar. 5, 
2012), http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/03/05-drones-philippines-ahmed. 
4. Currier, supra note 2. 
5. Ryan Gallagher, FBI Fesses Up: We’ve Used Domestic Drones 10 Times, SLATE (July 26, 2013, 4:37 
PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/07/26/fbi_admits_in_letter_to_rand_paul_that_it_s_used_ 
domestic_drones_10_times.html. 
6. Adam Entous et al., U.S. Tightens Drone Rules, WALL ST. J., (Nov. 4, 2011), http://online. 
wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970204621904577013982672973836. 
7. Greg Miller, At CIA, a Convert to Islam Leads the Terrorism Hunt, WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2012), 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-03-24/world/35447818_1_cia-officials-robert-grenier-ctc [hereinafter 
At CIA]; Greg Miller, White House Approves Broader Yemen Drone Campaign, WASH. POST (Apr. 25, 2012), 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-04-25/world/35452363_1_signature-strikes-drone-strikes-qaeda 
[hereinafter White House approves]. 
8. See generally INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS & CONFLICT RESOLUTION CTR. (STAN. L. SCH.) & GLOBAL 
JUSTICE CLINIC (N.Y.U. SCH. OF L.), LIVING UNDER DRONES: DEATH, INJURY, AND TRAUMA TO CIVILIANS 
FROM US DRONE PRACTICES IN PAKISTAN, (Sept. 2012), available at http://www.livingunderdrones.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/10/Stanford-NYU-Living-Under-Drones.pdf [hereinafter LIVING UNDER DRONES]. 
9. Chris Woods et al., Emerging from the Shadows: US Covert Drone Strikes in 2012, BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2013/01/03/emerging-from-
the-shadows-us-covert-drone-strikes-in-2012-2/. 
10. Drone Strikes Kill, supra note 1. 
11. Id. 
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This Article will use on-the-ground, eyewitness reports, recently leaked 
Justice Department legal analysis, and HELLFIRE12 missiles’ specifications and 
testing data to explore the legality of signature strikes under International 
Humanitarian Law (“IHL”) insofar as the principles of distinction and 
proportionality are concerned. Additionally, it will interrogate claims that drone 
technology itself is inherently less likely to lead to civilian casualties due to 
claims of drones’ accuracy and precision, as well as assertions that U.S. drone 
pilots are unburdened by the psychological stresses that normally accompany 
“traditional” military operations. 
This Article will begin with a short history of the use of drones in the global 
war on terror, before confirming that IHL applies where signature strikes have 
been most frequently used.13 The sections that follow will discuss signature strike 
protocol and its usefulness as a proxy for direct participation in combat,14 and 
then move on to an assessment of proportionality.15 After addressing arguments 
that drone technology inherently distinguishes and minimizes the danger of 
disproportionally, the final sections will discuss the relevance of IHL in a post-
9/11 world.16 Finally, the Article will conclude with a discussion of the 
ramifications of signature drones strikes, both for local populations and for 
American strategic objectives.17 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY: SIGNATURE STRIKES AND THE WAR ON TERROR 
Sources generally trace the birth of the drone program to 2000, when the CIA 
began flying unstaffed drones over Afghanistan to support military surveillance 
operations.18 Some reports indicate that the first drone strike was a joint effort 
between the CIA and the military, when an armed drone was sent after six 
terrorist suspects in Yemen on November 3, 2002.19 Lieutenant General Michael 
DeLong, watching a video feed at Centcom headquarters in Tampa, called then 
 
12. According to Boeing, the HELLFIRE missile (initially named the Helicopter Launched Fire and 
Forget missile), “is a short-range, laser or radar-guided, air-to-ground missile system designed to defeat tanks 
and other individual targets, while minimizing the exposure of the launch vehicle to enemy fire. It was designed 
during the 1970s as a multimission, anti-armour, precision attack weapon that would be effective against tanks, 
bunkers and structures. Advanced development of the missile continued through 1976, when the U.S. Army 
awarded an engineering contract to Rockwell International.” History: AMG-114 HELLFIRE Missile, BOEING, 
http://www.boeing.com/boeing/history/bna/hellfire.page (last visited Nov. 10, 2013). 
13. See infra Part II. 
14. See infra Part V. 
15. See infra Part VI. 
16. See infra Part VII. 
17. See infra Part VIII. 
18. John Sifton, A Brief History of Drones, THE NATION (Feb. 27, 2012), http://www.thenation. 
com/article/166124/brief-history-drones#. 
19. Chris Woods, ‘OK, Fine. Shoot him.’ Four Words That Heralded a Decade of Secret US Drone 
Killings, BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (Nov. 3, 2012), http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/ 
2012/11/03/ok-fine-shoot-him-four-words-that-heralded-a-decade-of-secret-us-drone-killings/. 
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CIA Director George Tenet, and together, they decided to fire. “Tenet goes, 
‘[y]ou going to make the call?’ And [DeLong] said, ‘I’ll make the call.’ [Tenet] 
says, ‘[t]his SUV over here is the one that has Ali in it.’ [DeLong] said, ‘OK, 
fine.’ You know, ‘[s]hoot him.’ They lined it up and shot it.”20 
Eight thousand miles away, the drone fired, killing a U.S. citizen along with 
the five other men in the SUV.21 One of these men, the intended target,22 was 
Qa’id Salim Sinan al-Harithi, an Al-Qaeda affiliate accused of orchestrating the 
attack on the USS Cole.23 Al-Harethi had not been on the FBI’s twenty-two most-
wanted terrorist fugitive list at the time of his death, and although investigators 
had wanted to question him about the USS Cole bombing, law enforcement 
officials were not consulted before the strike was carried out.24 
According to other sources, however, the first use of armed drones occurred 
in February of 2002, when a CIA-operated drone spotted a “tall man” around 
whom others were “acting with reverence.”25 As in the Yemeni operation, the 
strike against the tall man was run entirely by the CIA, absent any pretext of 
support for a military mission.26 “A decision was made to fire the Hellfire 
missile,” at the target, although the identity of the person or organization making 
this decision still remains unclear.27 But the “tall man” was not Osama bin 
Laden.28 Reporters who traveled to the site of the strike learned that he was a 
local named Daraz Khan, who at 5’11” was tall compared to other Afghans, but 
“six inches shorter than bin Laden.”29 Daraz Khan died along with two others, 
neither of whom were alleged terrorists.30 Military officials insisted nonetheless 
that the target had been “legitimate.”31 
Towards the end of President Bush’s second term, “Roger,” a code name for 
the person heading the drone program,32 argued that the CIA should launch 
attacks based solely on an individual’s observed “pattern of behavior” or 
“signature.”33 President Bush agreed, and the frequency of CIA-operated drone 
 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Sifton, supra note 18. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. At CIA, supra note 7. 
33. Id.; Azmat Khan, The Covert Convert Behind the CIA’s Drone Program (Mar. 26, 2012, 2:02 PM), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/afghanistan-pakistan/secret-war/the-covert-convert-behind-the-cias-
drone-program/. 
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strikes increased dramatically.34 Upon taking office, however, President Obama 
expressed reservations about the use of “signature strikes.”35 One advisor 
reportedly told him: 
“Mr. President, we can see that there are a lot of military-age males 
down there, men associated with terrorist activity, but we don’t 
necessarily know who they are.” Obama reacted sharply, “[t]hat’s not 
good enough for me.” According to one adviser describing the 
president’s unease: “He would squirm . . . he didn’t like the idea of kill 
‘em and sort it out later.”36 
Like other controversial counterterrorism policies the Obama administration 
inherited, “signature strikes” did end up “good enough,” and President Obama 
overcame his initial discomfort to eventually become an enthusiastic supporter of 
the drone program.37 In 2009, he organized the drone program into fourteen drone 
“orbits,” each consisting of three drones providing constant surveillance over the 
tribal areas of Pakistan.38 Strikes increased, and whereas the Bush administration 
ordered one drone strike over Pakistan in all of 2004, the Obama administration 
was ordering a strike every four days when the program was at peak usage,39 with 
fifty-three strikes in 2009 and 117 in 2010.40 
By 2011, drones had logged approximately 2.7 million hours of flight time 
and completed over 80,000 missions.41 Strikes in Pakistan killed more than 1,500 
people between 2009 and 2011 alone,42 and Pakistani officials, along with 
American diplomats and military personnel, complained that the relationship 
between the two countries was incurring damage as a result.43 Strikes in Pakistan 
had become so frequent in fact, that the U.S. military found itself in the unusual 
position of urging the CIA to use restraint, complaining that the CIA launched 
attacks even during high-level diplomatic exchanges with Pakistan.44 The CIA 
 
34. Entous et al., supra note 6. 
35. Micah Zenko, Targeted Killing and Signature Strikes, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (July 16, 2012), 
http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2012/07/16/targeted-killings-and-signature-strikes/. 
36. Id.  
37. Entous et al., supra note 6. 
38. Id.  
39. Woods, supra note 19. 
40. Indira A.R. Lakshmanan, Pakistan Ends Drone Strikes in Blow to U.S. War on Terror, BLOOMBERG 
(Mar. 12, 2012, 7:22 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-13/pakistan-tells-white-house-to-stop-
drone-missions-after-disputes-fray-ties.html. 
41. Thomas M. McDonnell, Sow What You Reap? Using Predator and Reaper Drones to Carry Out 
Assassinations or Targeted Killings of Suspected Islamic Terrorists, 44 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 243, 248 
(2012). 
42. Entous et al., supra note 6. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
02_BENSON.EICREVIEW.FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/17/2014 3:12 PM 
2014 / Signature Drone Strikes and International Humanitarian Law 
22 
was urged to “be more selective,” particularly with Osama bin Laden dead and 
Pakistan demanding an end to signature strikes.45 
In response, the Obama administration launched a review that led to minor 
changes in the program: the State Department would participate more heavily in 
strike decisions, Pakistan would be given advance notice of drone strikes on a 
more regular basis, and the CIA would agree to suspend operations when 
Pakistani officials visited the United States46 The name of the program was also 
changed from “signature strike” to TADS.47 According to Daniel Klaidman of the 
Council on Foreign Relations: 
[S]ignature strike has gotten to be, you know, sort of a pejorative term. 
They sometimes call it crowd killing. And it makes a lot of people 
uncomfortable . . . So the CIA actually changed the name of signature 
strikes to something called TADS . . . . I had the acronym but I didn’t 
know what it stood for . . . eventually I figured it out. It was [sic] terrorist 
attack disruption strike. And I was going to put it in . . . Newsweek. And 
actually it was the excerpt from my book. And various agencies from the 
government were very unhappy about that. And I sort of could not 
understand why  . . . they said, well, it’s a classified term. And I said, 
well, why would it be classified? It doesn’t make any sense. It’s just a 
term to describe . . . . a particular kind of activity that we know takes 
place . . . they asked me not to print it . . . You know, I printed it 
anyway.48 
The name change to TADS did not reflect a profound structural policy shift 
and was not accompanied by a reduction in the use of signature strikes.49 In the 
first ten days of 2013, there were seven drone strikes in Pakistan alone, which 
killed at least forty people,50 and in January of that year, President Obama 
announced that he wanted John Brennan, a key architect of the drone program, to 
head the CIA.51 The drone program, therefore, has a considerable fan base and 
plenty of proponents within the Obama Administration, in the media, and in 
 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. David E. Sanger et al., Views from the Newsroom: Challenges to American Power, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN REL. (June 22, 2012), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/audio-video/david-sanger-and-
daniel-klaidman-on-national-security. 
48. Id. 
49. Spencer Ackerman, U.S. Drones Pound Pakistan, Which Responds by Doing Exactly Nothing, WIRED 
(Jan. 10, 2013, 12:45 PM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/01/pakistan-drone-war/; Peter Bergen & 
Jennifer Rowland, John Brennan, Obama’s Drone Warrior, CNN (Jan. 9, 2013, 8:39 AM), http://www. 
cnn.com/2013/01/07/opinion/bergen-brennan-drones. 
50. Ackerman, supra note 49. 
51. Bergen & Rowland, supra note 49. 
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academia.52 This article will consider pro-drone arguments in a later section, but 
first, it will confirm that IHL, otherwise known as the laws of war, applies where 
signature strikes are deployed. 
III. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: WHEN IT APPLIES, AND WHAT IT 
MEANS IN A POST-9/11 WORLD 
As per the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(“ICTY”)’s Tádic decision, the threshold for determining that a non-international 
armed conflict (“NIAC”) is at hand breaks down into two elements: “(a) the 
intensity of the violence and (b) the organization of the parties.”53 Both must be 
“evaluated on a case-by-case basis by weighing up a host of indicative data.”54 
Protocol II excludes: 
situations of internal disturbances and tensions . . . and other acts of a 
similar nature . . . Relevant factors that contribute to an armed conflict 
include: intensity; number of active participants . . . duration and 
protracted character of the violence; organization and discipline of the 
parties; capacity to respect IHL; collective, open, and coordinated 
character of the hostilities; direct involvement of governmental armed 
force . . . and de facto authority by the non-state actor over potential 
victims.55 
Therefore, the section below will confirm that conflicts are at hand where 
signature strikes are used, it will then discuss what this means under international 
law. 
A. Yemen 
In considering the criteria of threshold and intensity of the conflict in Yemen, 
this article will limit its analysis to the drone strikes and joint operations between 
Yemeni and American authorities that began in 2009. 
The Washington Post reported in early 2010 that “U.S. military teams and 
intelligence agencies are deeply involved in secret joint operations with Yemeni 
troops who in the past six weeks have killed scores of people, among them six of 
fifteen top leaders of a regional Al-Qaeda affiliate, according to senior 
 
52. See generally id. 
53. Sylvain Vité, Typology of Armed Conflicts in International Humanitarian Law: Legal Concepts and 
Actual Situations, 91 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 69, 72 (2009). 
54. Id. 
55. Marco Sassòli, Transnational Armed Groups and International Humanitarian Law, 6 HPCR 
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES 1, 6 (2006). 
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administration officials.”56 The Post also reported, “American advisers are acting 
as intermediaries between the Yemeni forces and hundreds of U.S. military and 
intelligence officers . . . the combined efforts have resulted in more than two 
dozen ground raids and airstrikes [in Yemen].”57 The New York Times 
corroborated the existence of such raids, and characterized American operations 
in Yemen as part of a “shadow war” involving American personnel, cruise 
missiles, and fighter jets.58 
Signature strikes were approved for use in Yemen in 2011, and drones are 
currently launched with the consent of the Yemeni government from the U.S. 
Africa Command, a military base in Djibouti.59 Some claim that drones are only 
used in Yemen “when there is clear indication of the presence of an Al-Qaeda 
leader or [alternatively] of plotting against targets in the United States or 
Americans overseas.”60 Others, like The Wall Street Journal, concluded the 
opposite, reporting on April 25th, 2012 that the administration had relaxed 
circumstances wherein signature strikes could be used, approving signature lite 
for Yemen.61 
State Department Legal Adviser Harold Koh gave a speech to the American 
Society of International Law in early 2010 in which he expressed agreement with 
the view that “the United States is in an armed conflict with Al-Qaeda, as well as 
the Taliban, and associated forces.”62 Additionally he stated that the United States 
was permitted to “use force consistent with its inherent right to self-defense 
under international law.”63 Finally, he said that attacks must also conform to “law 
of war principles” including those of distinction and proportionality; however, 
this final issue will be addressed in later sections.64 
Given the frequency of drone strikes and other military operations against 
Al-Qaeda in the tribal areas of Yemen for nearly two years, there can be little 
doubt that U.S. activities in Yemen rise to the level of an armed conflict.65 The 
 
56. Dana Priest, U.S. Military Teams, Intelligence Deeply Involved in Aiding Yemen on Drone Strikes, 
WASH. POST, (Jan. 27, 2010), at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2010/01/26/AR2010012604239.html. 
57. Id.  
58. Scott Shane et al., Secret Assault on Terrorism Widens on Two Continents, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 14, 
2010), at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/15/world/15shadowwar.html?pagewanted=all. 
59. Currier, supra note 2; Susan Breau et al., Discussion Paper 2: Drone Attacks, International Law, and the 
Recording of Civilian Casualties of Armed Conflict, OXFORD RESEARCH GROUP 1, 1 (June 2011), available at 
http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/sites/default/files/ORG%20Drone%20Attacks%20and%20 
International%20Law%20Report.pdf. 
60. White House Approves, supra note 7. 
61. See id. 
62. Harold Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, Keynote Address at the American Society for 
International Law Annual Meeting: The Obama Administration and International Law (March 25, 2010). 104 
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 207, 218 (2010). 
63. Id.  
64. Id. See Parts IV-VI.  
65. See Priest, supra note 56; see also Vité, supra note 53, at 72. 
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fact that these activities are at the invitation of the Yemeni government, or at the 
very least occur with its permission, renders the conflict non-international.66 
B. Pakistan 
In theory, Pakistan and the United States are allies, and although there is 
some discomfort with the frequency and intensity of drone strikes in the tribal 
region of Pakistan, there have been cases wherein certain attacks have been 
praised, if not celebrated, by Pakistani officials.67 The “tribal” region, to be clear, 
refers to the FATA, on the Pakistan side of the Durand line.68 After Pakistan 
gained its independence from the British Empire in 1947, this area was officially 
left to the management of local tribes in keeping with the British system, wherein 
the tribes were held “collectively responsible” for maintaining security in the 
territory.69 During the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, FATA 
became a sort of a sanctuary for Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda, as well as a 
hotbed of political (and sometimes military) activity directed against the Pakistan 
government by disenchanted Pashtun youths.70 Therefore, a common argument is 
that FATA is an “ungoverned territory” outside of Pakistani control.71 But some 
Pakistani officials see things differently, and “all leading political parties in 
Pakistan declared” in a December 2010 statement that drone strikes in this region 
“compromis[e] the sovereignty of Pakistan.”72 
Even so, the Pakistan government has assisted the U.S. government in the 
execution of these sovereignty-compromising drone strikes, occasionally 
claiming that “militants,” rather than U.S. drones, have been responsible for 
civilian deaths in spite of evidence to the contrary.73 Furthermore, the intended 
targets of the CIA drone program in Pakistan are Al-Qaeda operatives, their 
affiliates, members of the Taliban, and those responsible for the 9/11 attacks.74 
This conflict, it should be noted, has also been characterized as “part and parcel 
of the Non-International Armed Conflict in Afghanistan.”75 
 
66. See Priest, supra note 56; see also Vité, supra note 53, at 72. 
67. Shuja Nawaz, Drone Attacks Inside Pakistan: Wayang or Willing Suspension of Disbelief?,12 GEO. J. 
INT’L AFF. 79, 80 (2011), available at http://journal.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/Drone-Attacks-Inside-
Pakistan-Wayang-or-Willing-Suspension-of-Disbelief.pdf.  
68. The Durand Line refers to the Pakistan-Afghan border, which was drawn in 1893 by the British 
government. For more information, see Jayshree Bajoria, The Troubled Afghan-Pakistani Border, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN REL. (Mar. 20, 2009), http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/troubled-afghan-pakistani-border/p14905. 
69. Nawaz, supra note 67, at 81. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 82-83. 
72. Id. at 84. 
73. See generally Drones, supra note 1. 
74. Koh, supra note 62, at 218.  
75. Breau et al., supra note 59, at 1. 
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This conflict also rises without question to the level of an armed conflict set 
forth by Tádic, given that drone strikes killed 2,562-3,325 people in Pakistan 
between 2004 and 2012.76 There is also some indication that American troops and 
helicopters are stationed in Pakistan, though the official position is that they are 
there to conduct civil affairs-related training at the invitation of the Pakistan 
government.77 
Although drone strikes have tapered from their peak usage in 2010, residents 
of the northwest tribal region of Pakistan hear drones flying twenty-four hours 
per day, seven days per week, and report living with the fear that they could be 
struck at any moment.78 “Signature strikes make up a significant proportion of” 
drone strikes in Pakistan, and show no sign of abating.79 As the targets of drone 
strikes are non-state, transnational armed groups, and as drone strikes only take 
place with the approval of local officials, a non-international armed conflict is 
taking place in Pakistan. 
C. Afghanistan 
As of this writing, the conflict in Afghanistan is entering its eleventh year.80 
Although President Obama has promised a drawdown from Afghanistan and a 
near-complete reduction in ground troops by 2014, drone strikes have been 
occurring at an accelerated rate.81 In 2012, thirty-three drone strikes per month 
were being carried out in Afghanistan, compared to twenty-four and a half per 
month in 2011,82 and a recently leaked Justice Department White Paper, likely 
written around the time that a drone strike killed American citizen Anwar al-
Awlaki in Afghanistan, refers repeatedly to “applicable laws of war principles” 
and to th e conflict as “non-international.”83 Indeed, as Afghanistan drone strikes 
take place with the permission of the Afghan government and are “ordered by a 
 
76. Drone Strikes Kill, supra note 1.  
77. Noah Shachtman, 3 GIs Killed in Pakistan. Now Can We Start Treating This Like a Real War? 
(Updated Once More), WIRED (Feb. 3, 2010, 10:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/danger room/2010/02/3-gis-
killed-in-pakistan-when-do-we-start-treating-this-like-a-real-war/. 
78. Drone Strikes Kill, supra note 1. 
79. CENT. FOR CIVILIANS IN CONFLICT & COLUMBIA LAW SCH. HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, THE CIVILIAN 
IMPACT OF DRONES: UNEXAMINED COSTS, UNANSWERED QUESTIONS 9 (2012), available at http://web.law. 
columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/human-rights-institute/files/The%20Civilian%20Impact%20of%20 
Drones.pdf. [hereinafter CIVILIAN IMPACT OF DRONES]. 
80. Noah Shachtman, Military Stats Reveal Epicenter of U.S. Drone War, WIRED (Nov. 9, 2012, 4:00 
AM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/11/drones-afghan-air-war/. 
81. See id. 
82. Id. 
83. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LAWFULNESS OF A LEGAL OPERATION DIRECTED AGAINST A U.S. CITIZEN 
WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADER OF AL-QA’IDA OR AN ASSOCIATED FORCE 1, 3, available at 
http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf.  
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local commander, overseen by military lawyers,”84 the ICRC agrees with the 
Justice Department’s assessment that the conflict is non-international.85 
IV. IHL APPLIES TO SIGNATURE STRIKES IN AFGHANISTAN,  
YEMEN, AND PAKISTAN 
Given that IHL applies in Yemen, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, each party is 
bound to apply at minimum the fundamental provisions contained in Article 3 
common to all four Geneva Conventions, which are further developed in the 
Geneva Protocol II of 1977. Both Common Article 3 and Geneva Protocol II 
apply with equal force to all parties in an armed conflict, government and 
transnational armed groups alike.86 The rules of customary international law as 
well as the basic principles of distinction, military necessity, and proportionality 
similarly apply, given that IHL is in play.87 Article 52, section 1 and section 2 of 
Protocol I of 1977 authorizes armed attacks only if they are directed towards 
military objectives, and grants general protection to civilian objects.88 Although a 
number of states (including the United States) are not party to the Additional 
Protocol, this general principle of distinction is widely recognized as binding 
customary international law, meaning that states that have not signed the treaty 
are bound to the aspects recognized as customary.89 
It is, of course, tempting to conclude that IHL, while technically applicable, 
has become irrelevant in the post-9/11 world, given that the enemy is a 
transnational armed group rather than a nation state. But this is difficult to 
reconcile with the fact that Common Article 3 anticipated the existence of such 
groups and clearly applies to conflicts with them, even if these groups are 
themselves not parties to relevant treaties.90  
 
84. Shachman, supra note 80. 
85. Annyssa Bellal et al., International Law and Armed Non-State Actors in Afghanistan, 93 INT’L REV. 
OF THE RED CROSS 47, 51 (2011), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/review/ 2011/irrc-881-bellal-
giacca-casey-maslen.pdf. 
86. Common Article 2 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 states, “[i]n addition to the provisions which 
shall be implemented in peacetime, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any 
other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of 
war is not recognized by one of them. The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation 
of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.” For 
analysis and more information, see ICRC, HOW IS THE TERM “ARMED CONFLICT” DEFINED IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW? 1 (March 2008), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf. 
87. JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW, VOL. 1: RULES XXXV (2009), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/ files/other/customary-international-
humanitarian-law-i-icrc-eng.pdf. 
88. See ICRC, supra note 86, at 2. 
89. For a discussion of applications for Customary International Law see Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, ICRC, http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/customary-law/ 
overview-customary-law.htm (last visited Dec. 12, 2013). 
90. Bellal et al., supra note 85, at 55. 
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According to the ICRC: 
To what extent Common Article 3 directly addresses [armed non-state 
actors, or “ANSAs”] has been debated. The article states that ‘each Party 
to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum’ its provisions. It 
has sometimes been claimed that the term ‘each Party’ does not apply to 
ANSAs, even though they may meet the criteria for being a party to the 
conflict, but only to government armed forces. State practice, 
international case law, and scholarship, have, however, confirmed that 
Common Article 3 applies to such ANSAs directly. . . Suffice to 
acknowledge that, although the legal reasoning to sustain this conclusion 
remains unsettled, it has now become uncontroversial, even 
‘commonplace,’ [sic] that ANSAs are bound by international 
humanitarian law.91 
Additionally, a resolution adopted in 1970 by the UN Assembly speaks of 
combatants in all armed conflicts,92 suggesting that attacks on transnational 
armed groups are still subject to the principles of distinction. The language of 
Article 51(3) is fairly succinct, stating: “civilians shall enjoy the protection 
afforded by this section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in 
hostilities.”93 
This is not to say that there are no reputable figures arguing that the rise of 
transnational armed groups has “discredited” literal or conservative readings of 
various aspects of International Humanitarian Law.94 Indeed, on February 10, 
2003, Professor Rüdiger Wolfrum, Director of the Max Planck Institute for 
Comparative Public Law and International Law, stated that international law was 
in a period of “transition.”95 Wolfrum referred to a “reformulation” of self-
defense concepts that impacted the “legitimacy” of the use of force, both in the 
realms of jus in bello and jus ad bellum.96 
However, at the World Summit of 2005, the Charter rules were reconfirmed 
as written, with the Summit Outcome document bereft of any new rules on the 
use of force contrary to those in the Charter.97 Furthermore, the Charter and its 
attendant legal framework has been used by Bush-Cheney and the Obama 
 
91. Id. at 55-56. 
92. Practice Relating to Rule 6. Civilians’ Loss of Protection from Attack, ICRC, http://www.icrc.org/ 
customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule6 (last visited July 26, 2013). 
93. Id. 
94. William K. Lietzau, Old Law, New Wars: Jus Ad Bellum in the Age of Terrorism, 8 MAX PLANCK 
Y.B. OF U.N. L. 384, 399 (2004). 
95. Id. at 386. 
96. Id. 
97. Mary Ellen O’Connell, Drones Under International Law, WASH. UNIV. L. INT’L DEBATE SERIES 585, 
590 (2010). 
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administration as a source of authority that legitimates the right to self-defense,98 
making it difficult to conclude that the UN Charter has become irrelevant. 
President Obama and his supporters, in fact, have used essentially the same 
arguments as Bush-Cheney, contending that that the United States is “in armed 
conflict with Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces in response to the 9/11 
attacks, and we may also use force consistent with [the] inherent right of national 
self-defense.”99 John Brennan, a top counter-terrorism adviser to the Obama 
administration, to this end, claimed: 
There is nothing in international law that bans the use of remotely piloted 
aircraft for [the above] purpose or that prohibits us from using lethal 
force against our enemies outside of an active battlefield, at least when 
the country involved consents or is unable or unwilling to take action 
against the threat.100 
Finally, the recently leaked Justice Department White Paper refers repeatedly 
to “laws of war principles” and “international law” throughout and was likely 
written in 2010.101 It is thus possible to conclude that the United States 
government still regards international law, the laws of war, and IHL as sources of 
authority. 
The ongoing use of IHL as a source of legitimacy, both in private and public 
government communications about the global war on terror,102 makes it difficult 
to conclude that IHL is irrelevant in a post 9/11 world. This Article will now turn 
to a discussion of “signature strikes” and whether they are an appropriate proxy 
for “direct participation” as defined by IHL. If so, it can be concluded that the 
principle of distinction is respected by signature strike protocol. If not, the 
legality of signature strike protocol may be in doubt. 
V. SIGNATURE STRIKES AND “OBSERVED PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOR:” A LEGAL 
(OR USEFUL) PROXY FOR “DIRECT PARTICIPATION?” 
The theory behind signature strikes is that an individual’s pattern of 
behavior—or “signature”—serves as a proxy for determining if that individual 
 
98. See, e.g., Legal Advisor William H. Taft IV’s Remarks Regarding the Use of Force Under 
International Law, given Oct. 27, 2004, which repeatedly invokes the U.N. Charter’s right of self-defense and 
its applicability to September 11th, available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/2004/78298.htm. See generally Koh, 
supra note 62. For the Obama administration’s reliance on the U.N. Charter and its attendant legal framework to 
justify the use of drones and the use of force in Yemen and elsewhere, see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 
83, at 3.  
99. Stephanie Kennedy, Top Aide To Barack Obama Pleads the Case for the Use of Drones, ABC NEWS 
(May 1, 2012), http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2012/s3492761.htm. 
100. Id.  
101. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 83, at 4. 
102. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 99. 
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either has a continuous combat function (making the individual a lawful 
combatant) or alternatively, is directly participating in the conflict (possibly 
making that individual an unlawful combatant).103 If the individual is a 
combatant, lawful or otherwise, the use of lethal force is generally appropriate 
under international law.104 “Direct participation” in hostilities, according to IHL, 
occurs when a given act fulfills the following cumulative criteria: 
1.  The act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations or 
military capacity of a party to an armed conflict or, alternatively, to 
inflict death, injury, or destruction on persons or objects protected 
against direct attack (threshold of harm), and 
2.  There must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm 
likely to result either from that act, or from a coordinated military 
operation of which that act constitutes an integral part (direct 
causation), and 
3.  The act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required 
threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the 
detriment of another (belligerent nexus).105 
Activities that meet the necessary “threshold of harm” might include: 
Capturing, wounding or killing military personnel; damaging military 
objects; or restricting or disturbing military deployment, logistics and 
communication, for example through sabotage, erecting road blocks or 
interrupting the power supply of radar stations. Interfering electronically 
with military computer networks (computer network attacks) and 
transmitting tactical targeting intelligence for a specific attack are also 
examples. The use of time-delayed weapons such as mines or booby-
traps, remote-controlled weapon systems such as unmanned aircraft, also 
“directly” causes harm to the enemy and, therefore, amounts to direct 
participation in hostilities.106 
Alternatively, a given activity could fall under the category of “indirect” 
participation.107 These types of activities, which fail to meet the necessary 
 
103. See Practice Relating to Rule 6, supra note 92. 
104. See Id. 
105. NILS MELZER, ICRC, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN 
HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 20 (2009), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/ 
assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf. 
106. Direct Participation in Hostilities: Questions and Answers, ICRC RESOURCE CENTRE (Feb. 6, 
2009), http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/faq/direct-participation-ihl-faq-020609.htm. 
107. Id. 
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threshold of harm, are indirect participation because they contribute to the 
general war effort of the party but “[do] not directly cause harm and, therefore, 
[do] not necessarily lead to a loss of protection against direct attack.”108 This 
includes the production and shipment of helmets for military personnel, “the 
construction of roads and other infrastructure, and financial, administrative and 
political support for military bodies.”109 
Direct participants and persons with continuous combat function may be 
attacked at any time under IHL: while planning military operations, while 
engaging in active hostilities, or even when they are on their way to the barracks 
from the battlefield.110 Civilians, on the other hand, are regarded as impermissible 
military targets, and traditionally, have been negatively defined as individuals 
who are not directly participating in hostilities.111 Specific acts may be considered 
“direct participation” in conflict even if they are not likely to adversely affect the 
military operations or military capacity of a party to the conflict.112 Absent 
military harm, however, such acts must at the very least be likely to cause death, 
injury, or destruction.113 
Signature strike protocol, however, does not map onto the definition of direct 
participation or continuous combat function under IHL. Comments by CIA and 
White House officials indicate that drone strike operators may be instructed to 
assume all military-aged men in a strike zone are “combatants” unless there is 
explicit intelligence proving that the men do not have a continuous combat 
function, or are not directly participating in hostilities.114 In the aforementioned 
leaked Justice Department White Paper, the Administration argued for an 
expanded definition of “imminent” danger, contending that an individual’s mere 
membership in Al-Qaeda would be enough for exposure to the legal use of lethal 
force.115 Additionally, the administration claims that defining the scope of “direct 
participation” in this manner allows the United States to “avoid broader harm to 
civilians and civilian objects.”116 Counterterrorism officials have furthermore 
insisted that a person in an area of known terrorist activity or in the presence of a 
top Al-Qaeda operative is most likely up to no good and thus a suitable target for 
a signature strike: “Al-Qaeda is an insular, paranoid organization—innocent 
neighbors don’t hitchhike rides in the back of trucks headed for the border with 
 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. See MELZER, supra note 105, at 16. 
111. Id. at 20. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 46. 
114. Chris Woods, Analysis: Obama Embraced Redefinition of ‘Civilian’ in Drone Wars, BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (May 29, 2012), http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/05/29/analysis-how-
obama-changed-definition-of-civilian-in-secret-drone-wars/. 
115. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 83, at 8. 
116. Ryan J. Vogel, Drone Warfare and the Law of Armed Conflict, 39 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 101, 
121 (2011). 
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guns and bombs,” one official told the New York times on condition of 
anonymity.117 
Acting on these sorts of assumptions, however, may be against international 
law. Even in the context of the War on Terror, actors do not become a legitimate 
target due to official membership status in a terrorist organization, nor through 
their physical association with members of a terrorist organization.118 Actors 
become legitimate targets due to their role in the organization as determined by 
actual activities.119 In other words, a man may have lunch with a member of Al-
Qaeda, attend prayers with him, attend a community meeting with him, or ride 
with him in the same pickup truck without losing his civilian status under IHL.120 
Furthermore, the idea of “membership” in an organization cannot be established 
simply through affiliations, family ties, or mere association; within the context of 
IHL, the term “combatants” refers only to members of a transnational group’s 
armed forces.121 In other words, a web developer for Al-Qaeda is most likely not 
a “combatant” consistent with a strict reading of IHL; a suicide bomber, 
however, is. 
According to the ICRC: 
For the practical purposes of the principle of distinction, therefore, 
membership in such groups cannot depend on abstract affiliation, family 
ties, or other criteria prone to error, arbitrariness or abuse. Instead, 
membership must depend on whether the continuous function assumed 
by an individual corresponds to that collectively exercised by the group 
as a whole, namely the conduct of hostilities on behalf of a non-state 
party to the conflict. Consequently, under IHL, the decisive criterion for 
individual membership in an organized armed group is whether a person 
assumes a continuous function for the group involving his or her direct 
participation in hostilities (hereafter: “continuous combat function”).122 
Worth noting again is the repeated use of words like “function” and “act.” In 
other words, there must be an action, and it must contribute to a continuous role 
in the group. The Obama administration’s insistence that a person in physical 
proximity to terrorists is a combatant is therefore not necessarily in compliance 
with international law.123 However, this method of counting casualties may 
 
117. Jo Becker & Scott Shane, Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 29, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda. 
html?pagewanted=3&_r=3&hp. 
118. MELZER, supra note 105, at 44. 
119. Id. 
120. See id. 
121. Id. at 33. 
122. Id. 
123. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 83. 
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explain the administration’s low tally of civilian deaths. As recently as 2011, 
Obama advisor and CIA director appointee John Brennan said “not a single 
noncombatant had been killed in a year of strikes.”124 On another occasion, an 
unnamed senior administration official told the New York Times that the number 
of civilians killed in drone strikes in Pakistan under the Obama administration 
was in the “single digits” and that any claims otherwise were “propaganda” from 
“militants.”125 
Colonel William Tart, a manager of drone operations at Creech Air Force 
Base in Nevada, claimed that he never saw a civilian casualty in his two years 
with the program, insisting inter alia that drone pilots are privy to such detailed 
information that mistakes rarely occur.126 
The MQ-9, an unstaffed aerial vehicle capable of carrying up to four 
HELLFIRE missiles and a pair of 500-pound laser-guided bombs, is equipped 
with an infrared camera that enables the operator to “see some[one] smoking a 
cigarette from about 25,000 feet.”127 In certain regions of Pakistan, drones gather 
surveillance data constantly. According to a man who lost his cousin in a drone 
strike, “when the weather is clear, three or four [drones] can be seen . . . . They 
are in the air 24 [hours a day], seven [days a week], but not when it’s raining.”128 
This constant level of drone surveillance through high-powered, infrared 
cameras allows drone operators to watch private activities such as spousal 
intimacy, parents playing with their children, and family members mourning at a 
funeral.129 Drone operators, Colonel Tart explained, become extremely familiar 
with the lives of people in a strike zone: “[w]e watch people for months. We see 
them playing with their dogs or doing their laundry. We know their patterns like 
we know our neighbors’ patterns. We even go to their funerals.”130 
Even so, an official speaking to the New York Times noted that the use of a 
“signature”, which in theory should map onto behavior consistent with terrorism, 
or at least, with combatancy, often accidentally conflates civilians with 
combatants: “[i]t bothers me when they say there were seven guys, so they must 
all be militants. They count the corpses and they’re not really sure who they 
are.”
131
 Others—also from the State Department, also speaking to the New York 
Times on condition of anonymity—complain that when the CIA sees “three guys 
 
124. Becker & Shane, supra note 117. 
125. Id. 
126. Nicola Abé, Dreams in Infrared: The Woes of an American Drone Operator, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Dec. 
14, 2012, 5:03 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/pain-continues-after-war-for-american-drone-
pilot-a-872726.html. 
127. David Piper, Trim Reaper: Streamlined Killer Drone Begins Combat Operations in Iraq, FOX NEWS 
(July 24, 2008), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,389962,00.html. 
128. LIVING UNDER DRONES, supra note 8, at 150. 
129. See generally Abé, supra note 126. 
130. Id. 
131. Becker & Shane, supra note 117. 
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doing jumping jacks,” the agency thinks they are witnessing some sort of a 
terrorist training camp.132 
There is little public information about what kinds of behavior are 
sufficiently suspicious to merit a signature strike. Still, it can be inferred from a 
combination of confidential information leaks and investigative reporting that the 
“signature” of a potential militant or terrorist is defined very broadly. Once again, 
it bears mentioning that “terrorist” and “militant” are political terms with no 
grounding in IHL: in IHL, a person is either a combatant or civilian, and there is 
no such thing as a “militant” or a “terrorist.”133 The “signature” of a terrorist or 
militant, therefore, may not be consistent with the “signature” of a combatant 
simply because “combatant” and “terrorist/militant” are not synonyms.134 
Of course, this may be a feature, rather than a bug, of the signature strike 
program, which may be in place to snuff out militants and terrorists rather than 
snuff out combatants. It should also be noted that in addition to “signature 
strikes,” drone operators may use “personality strikes,” which refers to strikes 
targeting known terrorists or known members of Al-Qaeda.135 Signature strikes, 
on the other hand, target persons who act like they are Al-Qaeda.136 This, of 
course, assumes that a person who acts like Al-Qaeda is Al-Qaeda. However, in 
some communities there may not be a significant difference between the day-to-
day behavior of Al-Qaeda and the day-to-day behavior of a civilian. In some 
strike zones, “fighters regularly intermingle with civilians . . . and do not wear 
uniforms,”137 and signature strike operators have conflated otherwise normal 
behavior with suspicious behavior on several occasions, targeting people who 
were carrying weapons, were present in a location identified as a militant 
compound, or were traveling in a convoy of vehicles.138 Individuals have also 
been targeted for driving a suspicious vehicle, spending time in or around certain 
facilities, or operating certain types of communications equipment.139 
One Pakistani community elder tried to explain the types of everyday, 
commonplace activities that would lead to drone strikes: 
[T]hese attacks have been on schools, on maliks, on elders, and on 
different buildings . . . [S]ometimes when people are moving in cars, 
they are hit. Sometimes when they are gathering with friends, they are 
 
132. Id. 
133. See MELZER, supra note 105, at 44. 
134. See generally ADVISORY SERVICE ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, ICRC, WHAT IS 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW? (July 2004), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/ 
what_is_ihl.pdf. 
135. Becker & Shane, supra note 117. 
136. See generally Eric Schmitt & David E. Sanger, Pakistan Shift Could Curtail Drone Strikes, N.Y. 
TIMES, (Feb 22, 2008), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/22/washington/22policy.html?_r=0. 
137. LIVING UNDER DRONES, supra note 8, at 112. 
138. CIVILIAN IMPACT OF DRONES, supra note 79, at 33, 41. 
139. Id. at 33. 
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hit. Sometimes when people are gathering to offer prayers to those killed, 
there are drone attacks on those people . . . [M]y own relatives, close 
family relatives, have been killed. Elders of the villages, the maliks, the 
children of the schools, other children, all have been victims of strikes. 
[In one case,] [t]here was a drone attack on a religious teacher while he 
was coming in a car with some other people, after which he was brought 
to the village. A lot of people were gathering, the small children and 
families were gathered, and another drone attack happened, killing the 
small children. Two drone attacks in a single day.140 
None of these activities, however, automatically equate to direct 
participation, nor turn a civilian into a person with a continuous combat 
function.141 Nor do they even rise to the level of indirect participation even under 
a liberal reading of IHL, given that they do not seem to contribute even indirectly 
to the success of enemy forces.142 To be sure, the fact that Taliban and Al-Qaeda 
fighters mingle regularly with civilian populations certainly poses challenges to 
drone operators and their commanders.143 However, IHL nonetheless dictates that 
militaries engaged in an armed conflict must always attempt to distinguish 
between legitimate and illegitimate targets for an attack.144 
Given that such a wide scope of activities exposes individuals to being 
targeted by a drone strike, (assuming, of course, that oral reports from FATA can 
be taken at face value) it is possible that a suspicious “signature” has been 
defined so broadly, and the definition of imminence expanded so greatly, that it 
serves as poor proxy for direct participation or continuous combat function. 
Alternatively, it can be concluded that the problem is not one of broadness, 
but of cultural context: suspicious behavior in the United States may not be 
suspicious in Pakistan, Afghanistan or Yemen. A drone operator launching 
missiles from a control room hundreds or thousands of miles away may be 
unable to contextualize what he is seeing or why he is seeing it, leading him to 
conflate normal behavior with suspicious activity. 
Although the amount and quality of cultural training drone pilots are exposed 
to is not made explicit, the Air Force discloses that newly recruited drone pilots 
are subjected to a four week, drone-specific training regimen.145 During the 
course of this training, each recruit is exposed to “strict instructions on rules of 
engagement, ‘and on when and how [to] employ ordnance’” combined with 
 
140. LIVING UNDER DRONES, supra note 8, at 152. 
141. See supra Part V. 
142. See supra Part V. 
143. LIVING UNDER DRONES, supra note 8, at 112. 
144. ICRC, BASIC RULES OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND THEIR ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS (1988), 
available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0365.pdf. 
145. Anna Mulrine, UAV Pilots, AIR FORCE MAGAZINE, Jan. 2009, at 34, 36, available at http://www. 
airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2009/January%202009/0109UAV.aspx. 
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training from soldiers in combat zones.146 The purpose of this training is to help 
them cultivate an awareness of friendly locations and strategies for positively 
identifying targets.147Although the training schedule is not disclosed to the public, 
the short period of training suggests that operators may not be heavily exposed to 
the normative cultural, ethnic, and religious practices common to the targeted 
country. Therefore, the most conservative application of signature strike protocol 
may not enable a drone operator to accurately interpret what is being seen, or 
understand why people are acting suspiciously, even if he has the best of 
intentions and a sincerely held interest in following IHL.148 
Signature strike protocol, therefore, not only risks violating the mandate to 
distinguish, but also the mandate to exercise proportionality, which will be 
discussed in the next section. 
VI. DO SIGNATURE STRIKES VIOLATE THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY? 
Proportionality is a critical component of IHL, and refers to the notion that 
an attack “which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury 
to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, [and] which 
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated, is prohibited.”149 Article 51(5)(b) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I 
prohibits “an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian 
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, 
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated.”150 
While Additional Protocol II does not contain an explicit reference to the 
principle of proportionality in attack,151 it has been argued that it “is inherent in 
the principle of humanity” explicitly applicable to the Protocol in the preamble,152 
and additionally, has been included in the Amended Protocol II to the 
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons,153 and is therefore relevant to 
non-international armed conflicts. For example, according to the U.S. Naval 
Handbook, “[i]t is not unlawful to cause incidental injury to civilians, or 
collateral damage to civilian objects, during an attack upon a legitimate military 
objective. Incidental injury or collateral damage must not, however, be excessive 
 
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
148. See supra Part V. 
149. Rule 14. Proportionality in Attack, ICRC CUSTOMARY IHL, http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/ 
docs/v1_cha_chapter4_rule14 (last visited Dec. 11, 2013). 
150. Id. 
151. Id.  
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
02_BENSON.EICREVIEW.FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/17/2014 3:12 PM 
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 27 
37 
in light of the military advantage anticipated by the attack.”154 The fact that drone 
strike protocol seems unable to take cultural context into account, however, may 
have lead to several disproportionate attacks on civilians in violation of IHL. 
For example, tribal elders hold a position in Pushtun culture that is difficult 
for the average American to appreciate. “Pushtunwali,” a Pushtun socio-legal 
system found in Afghanistan and Pakistan, is a series of local and cultural 
practices that regulate behavior and maintain social order.155 Pushtunwali, among 
other things, obligates a villager to open his home to tribal elders, including those 
that the United States has designated as “militants” or “terrorists.”156 In 
homosocial societies like Pakistan and Afghanistan, it is also possible that a tribal 
leader would meet with military-aged men for reasons other than to “plan or 
conduct attacks, regroup for future hostilities, [or] train.”157 As Waziristan 
resident Daud Khan explained, “all the local people must offer [the Taliban] 
food” and, if they stop by, it is impossible to turn them away.158 Cultural practices 
such as this may lead drone operators to conclude civilians are part of the 
Taliban, when in fact they are simply bound to offer them hospitality as dictated 
by Pushtunwali. 
The inability to contextualize commonplace social gatherings within their 
proper cultural frame has led on occasion to a disproportionate amount of civilian 
deaths. On one occasion, a signature strike was executed against a heavily armed 
group that was believed to be “act[ing] in a manner consistent with [Al-Qaeda]-
linked militants” and included men “connected to Al-Qaeda.”159 After executing 
the strike, the United States claimed it had killed twenty “militants”; however, 
community members and Pakistani officials said that the missiles had struck a 
“jirga”—a type of meeting held to resolve local disputes.160 Such a meeting 
requires the presence of high-ranking tribal officials, some of whom are Taliban, 
in order for the resolution to have any legitimacy.161 In the end, it turned out that 
only four Taliban were present and killed at the meeting because any resolution 
to the dispute would have lacked binding authority absent their approval.162 The 
 
154. THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, DEP’T OF THE NAVY, OFFICE 
OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS & HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSP., 
AND U.S. COAST GUARD § 8.1.2.1 (1995). 
155. MARINE CORPS INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY, CULTURAL INTELLIGENCE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS: 
PASHTUNS IN AFGHANISTAN 1, available at http://info.publicintelligence.net/MCIA-AfghanCultures/Pashtuns. 
pdf.  
156. See id. at 24. 
157. Vogel, supra note 116, at 122. 
158. CIVILIAN IMPACT OF DRONES, supra note 79, at 42. 
159. Scott Shane, Contrasting Reports of Drone Strikes, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2011), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2011/08/12/world/asia/12droneside.html; LIVING UNDER DRONES, supra note 8, at 57, n.283.  
160. CIVILIAN IMPACT OF DRONES, supra note 79, at 34. 
161. DONALD P. WRIGHT ET AL., A DIFFERENT KIND OF WAR: THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN OPERATION 
ENDURING FREEDOM OCTOBER 2001-SEPTEMBER 2005 11 (2010). 
162. CIVILIAN IMPACT OF DRONES, supra note 79, at 34. 
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rest of the dead included thirty-eight civilians, one of which was Daud Khan’s 
son.
163
 Pakistan’s Army Chief, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, issued a statement 
saying “[the] tribal elders had been ‘carelessly and callously targeted with 
complete disregard to human life.”164 
Western misunderstanding of Pakistani morés surrounding hospitality may 
also inadvertently fuel claims that Al-Qaeda intermix with civilian populations to 
use them as shields,165 and that a Taliban fighter will “purposefully obfuscate his 
belligerent status by posing as a civilian—and in many cases targets civilians and 
conducts operations in civilian settings. Al-Qaeda and its associates also 
routinely use protected persons and objects as shields.”166 
Along these lines, Ryan J. Vogel, foreign affairs specialist for the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense, invites consideration of the fact that our “foes gather in 
civilian settings, such as homes and boarding houses.”167 His conclusion 
highlights the many cultural and contextual obstacles that inform signature strike 
policy, as well as its current execution in South Asia and the Middle East: 
There is no doubt that a person’s residence is civilian in status, but when 
the home is used to house belligerents, store weapons, plan or conduct 
attacks, regroup for future hostilities, train, or any number of other 
activities that make an effective contribution to the war effort, that 
home’s nature, location, purpose, or use arguably changes in such a way 
that it forfeits its protected civilian status and becomes a military 
objective.168 
First, it should be noted that according to Article 50 of Protocol I, the 
presence of non-civilians within a civilian area does not automatically transform 
the area into a military object, and civilians conducting business with members of 
the armed forces do not automatically lose their civilian status.169 His argument, 
however, is that the house may be used to shelter “belligerents,” thus 
transforming the character of the house under IHL.170 Of course, “belligerents” 
are not a recognized category of persons under IHL; in the world of IHL, there 
 
163. Id. 
164. Id. 
165. Jordan J. Paust, Self-Defense Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. Use of Drones in 
Pakistan, 19 J. TRANS. NAT’L L. & POL’Y 237, 276 (2009). 
166. Vogel, supra note 116, at 117. 
167. Id. at 122. 
168. Id. 
169. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 50, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www. 
icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=E1F8F99C4C3F8FE4C12563CD00
51DC8A [hereinafter Geneva Protocol I]. 
170. Vogel, supra note 116, at 122. 
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are “combatants” and “civilians.”171 “Belligerent,” like “militant,” is a political 
category that has no meaning in the laws of war. If a house is used to shelter 
“combatants,” it may lose its civilian status, given, as aforementioned, that 
combatants are vulnerable to lethal force at any time.172 But if a house is used to 
shelter “belligerents,” its status is less clear. This fictional home may also remain 
“civilian” in status even if it hosts men who “regroup” for future hostilities.173 
Who is doing the regrouping? Fighters who need to rest before launching another 
attack or construction workers who are preparing to repair damaged civilian 
infrastructure? Without knowing who exactly is regrouping, from what they are 
regrouping, and why, it is difficult to comment on the legality of using lethal 
force under IHL. 
Even if we discard Article 50 of Protocol I and take Vogel’s arguments at 
face value, it is important to consider that he does not present these hypotheticals 
within the framework of Pushtunwali.174 In so doing, he fails to consider that a 
gathering where Taliban fighters are present can take place for the purposes of 
non-military objectives and can include people who are not a part of the Taliban, 
as well as any gathering of “military-aged” men, particularly in homosocial 
societies such as Pakistan, Yemen, and Afghanistan. 
The fact that a location is used for storing weapons, which, to Vogel, means 
that a civilian object has been turned into a military one,175 is also contextually 
dependent. Given the prevalence of guns and gun culture in Central Asia and the 
Middle East,176 weapons storage may not be an accurate proxy for direct 
participation, or even for establishing “continuous combat function” as per the 
language of Article 51(3).177 
Pakistan ranks sixth in the world in terms of per capita gun ownership,178 with 
11.6% of the civilian population armed with 18 million total small arms in 
civilian hands.179 Iraq is the fifth most armed country in the world, with 
approximately thirty-five guns per hundred people.180 In Yemen, where gun 
ownership is similarly part of local culture, government officials have expressed 
 
171. See Rule 14. Proportionality in Attack, supra note 149. 
172. Kennedy, supra note 99. 
173. See Geneva Protocol I, supra note 169. 
174. See Vogel, supra note 116, at 122. 
175. Id. 
176. See AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM. & REG’L HUMAN SEC. CTR., TRADITIONAL CULTURAL PRACTICES 
AND SMALL ARMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 14 (2002), available at http://www.quno. 
org/geneva/pdf/disarmament-peace/amman_seminar_report.pdf. 
177. MELZER, supra note 105, at 16; AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM. & REG’L HUMAN SEC. CTR., supra note 
176, at 14. 
178. Laura MacInnis, U.S. Most Armed Country With 90 Guns per 100 People, REUTERS, (Aug. 28, 
2007), http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/08/28/us-world-firearms-idUSL2834893820070828. 
179. Simon Rogers, Gun Homicides and Gun Ownership Listed by Country, GUARDIAN (July 22, 2010, 
8:01 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2012/jul/22/gun-homicides-ownership-world-list. 
180. MacInnis, supra note 178. 
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reservations that the presence of weapons can serve as a reasonable proxy for 
direct participation or for “militant” activity.181 “Every Yemeni is armed,” said 
one Yemeni official, “so how can they differentiate between suspected militants 
and armed Yemenis?”182 It is not an exaggeration to characterize “every Yemeni” 
as armed; Yemen has the second most guns per person out of every country on 
Earth with 54.8 guns for every hundred Yemenis.183 The United States, 
meanwhile, is the only country with more per capita privately owned guns than 
Yemen, with 88.8 guns for every hundred civilians.184 “Storing weapons” may 
indicate that a house is used for military purposes; however, depending on the 
cultural context in which it occurs, it may not. 
The prevalence of weapons in places like Yemen also makes it difficult to 
count the number of civilian casualties. Not only are many military-aged male 
non-combatants armed (much like in the United States),185 but confusion is 
further compounded by the Yemeni government’s active obfuscation of the 
number of civilian deaths: 
A rickety Toyota truck packed with 14 people rumbled down a desert 
road from the town of Radda, which Al-Qaeda militants once 
controlled. Suddenly a missile hurtled from the sky and flipped the 
vehicle over. Chaos. Flames. Corpses. Then, a second missile struck. 
Within seconds, 11 of the passengers were dead, including a woman and 
her 7-year-old daughter. A 12-year-old boy also perished that day, and 
another man later died from his wounds. The Yemeni government 
initially said that those killed were Al-Qaeda militants and that its 
Soviet-era jets had carried out the September 2nd attack. But tribal 
leaders and Yemeni officials would later say that it was an American 
assault and that all the victims were civilians who lived in a village near 
Radda, in central Yemen. U.S. officials last week acknowledged for the 
first time that it was an American strike. “Their bodies were burning,” 
recalled Sultan Ahmed Mohammed, 27, who was riding on the hood of 
the truck and flew headfirst into a sandy expanse. “How could this 
happen? None of us were Al-Qaeda.”186 
 
181. CIVILIAN IMPACT OF DRONES, supra note 79, at 33. 
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Against Militants in Yemen, WALL ST. J., (Apr. 26, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405 
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On one hand, it can be argued that this incident, like those in Pakistan, may 
have happened due to a misunderstanding of Yemeni culture. Perhaps mistakes 
like these would become infrequent if drone operators were given exposure to 
Yemeni or Pakistani behavior, culture, and customs, and had on-the-ground 
personnel approving drone strikes. 
On the other hand, drone strikes in Afghanistan “are ordered by a local 
commander, [and] overseen by military lawyers,”187 and Americans have had an 
ongoing presence for over a decade. There have nonetheless been culturally-
driven misunderstandings and misinterpretations resulting in civilian deaths. On 
one occasion, a group that included military age men decided to travel in a 
convoy through an insurgent stronghold for safety purposes.188 
From the surveillance of a Predator, US forces came to believe that the group 
was Taliban. As described by [a U.S.] Army officer who was involved: “[w]e all 
had it in our head, ‘[h]ey, why do you have 20 military age males at 5 a.m. 
collecting each other?’ . . . . There can be only one reason, and that’s because 
we’ve put [U.S. troops] in the area.” The US forces proceeded to interpret the 
unfolding events in accordance with their belief that the convoy was full of 
insurgents. Evidence of the presence of children became evidence of 
“adolescents,” unconfirmed suspicions of the presence of weapons turned into an 
assumption of their presence. The United States fired on the convoy, killing 
twenty-three people.189 
Signature strike protocol and its inability to properly distinguish between 
civilians and combatants,190 therefore, may lead to violations of proportionality, 
but so too might the unpredictable character of signature strike protocol itself due 
to the stress it inflicts on civilian populations.191 A common thread in interviews 
with Waziristan residents is a fear of the inherently uncertain and unpredictable 
nature of drone strikes.192 This fear has paralyzed entire communities, leading 
people to stop going to work, attending school, shopping at the market, or 
gathering in large groups.193 According to one man whose brother died in a drone 
strike: 
[“Before, e]verybody was involved in their [sic] own labor work. We 
were all busy. But since the drone attacks have started, everybody is very 
scared and everybody is terrorized . . . People are out of business, people 
are out of schools, because people are being killed by these drone 
 
187. Shachtman, supra note 80. 
188. CIVILIAN IMPACT OF DRONES, supra note 79, at 42. 
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190. LIVING UNDER DRONES, supra note 8, at 151.  
191. Id. at 149. 
192. Id. at 151. 
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attacks.” Tahir emphasized, “It’s not a [fictional] story. It’s brutality that 
we are undergoing and that needs to be stopped.”194 
The uncertainty of signature strike protocol may violate the principle of 
proportionality, given that the general rules of IHL were developed to “protect 
civilians from the effects of hostilities”195 and “limit the damage and provide care 
for the casualties.”196 The Red Cross suggests that the infliction of psychological 
trauma on civilians constitutes “[a] lack of respect shown by weapons bearers 
and their political operatives” for their obligations under IHL: “[t]he right to life, 
respect for family unity, and respect for dignity and physical and psychological 
integrity [which] are central to these obligations.”197 This suggests that the 
mandate to distinguish and use proportionality extends beyond the use of lethal 
force, armed attacks, or a strict reading of Article 52(2), and includes activities 
that inflict psychological trauma on civilians. 
The ICRC also acknowledges, however, that the law remains underdeveloped 
in this regard: the extent to which force can be used for purely psychological 
purposes, such as shutting down a civilian radio station for the sole purpose of 
undermining the morale of the civilian population, is an issue that has yet to be 
addressed authoritatively by the international community.198 Furthermore, there is 
no evidence that drone strike protocol operates with the intention of inciting 
terror among the civilian population.199 However, according to a Pakistani 
community elder: 
“We know that the consequences of drone strikes are extremely harsh. 
Our children, our wives know that our breadwinners, when they go out to 
earn a livelihood, they might not come back, and life may become very 
miserable for them in the years to come.” Khalid further explained, 
“Now we are always awaiting a drone attack and we know it’s certain 
and it’s eventual and it will strike us, and we’re just waiting to hear 
whose house it will strike, our relatives’, our neighbors’, or us. We do 
not know. We’re just always in fear.”200 
 
194. Id. 
195. Dr. Jakob Kellenberger, President, ICRC, Keynote Address at the 34th Round Table on Current 
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VII. ARGUMENTS FOR DRONES: “ACCURACY,” “PRECISION,”  
AND OPERATORS’ MENTAL HEALTH 
It should by this point be clear that signature drone strikes raise many 
uncomfortable issues and may violate IHL mandates regarding proportionality as 
well as the need to distinguish between civilians and combatants.201 Nevertheless, 
there are still many drone advocates and plenty of arguments advanced in favor 
of using drone technology, much of which revolves around drones’ purported 
adherence to the laws of war. For example, Andrew C. Orr, while admitting that 
civilian casualties pose legal challenges to the framework of IHL, states that: 
Targeted killing of Al-Qaeda fighters is permissible under Article 3, 
which applies protections to “persons taking no active part in the 
hostilities, including members of the armed forces who have laid down 
their arms and those placed hors de combat” . . . The drones do not attack 
such persons, instead targeting only Al-Qaeda fighters, which is 
permissible during an armed conflict.202 
Michael W. Lewis, professor at the Petit College of Law at Ohio Northern 
University, makes a similar argument, writing: 
The longer loiter time of drones allows for a much higher level of 
confidence that the target has been properly identified . . . Even if the 
drone is evading fire at the time of weapons release, those making the 
final decision to carry out the attack are not dealing with the decision-
impairing effects of mortal fear. Although the sanitary environment of 
the drone control room has been criticized for making war too much like 
a video game, it undoubtedly leads to much sounder proportionality 
determinations.203 
And finally, Bradley J. Strawser of the University of Connecticut, writing in 
the Journal of Military Ethics, claims: 
Recent studies bear out that UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones] 
appear to have, in fact, greater technical capabilities at making 
determinations of combatant status. Avery Plaw (2010) has recently 
compiled a database combining reports from a variety of sources on the 
results of United States UAV attacks carried out in Pakistan from 2004 to 
2007. This data shows that UAV strikes were far better at noncombatant 
 
201. See supra Part VI. 
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discrimination than all other methods used for engaging Taliban fighters 
in the region. For example, the UAV strikes resulted in a ratio of over 17 
to 1 of intended militant targets to civilian deaths compared with a 4 to 1 
ratio for Pakistan Special Weapons and Tactics Teams team offensives or 
a nearly 3 to 1 for Pakistan Army operations in the same region during 
the same time period. Or, compare the 17 to 1 ratio for the UAV 
employment to the shocking 0.125 to 1 militant to civilian casualty ratio 
estimate for all armed conflict worldwide for the year 2000 (Plaw 2010). 
If these numbers are even close to accurate, it seems that there is strong 
evidence which directly contradicts the central premise of objection 1. 
That is, UAVs are better, not worse, at noncombatant discrimination.204 
This Article does not attempt to single out these men’s views as particularly 
egregious or shocking. It also does not attempt to suggest that their respective 
publications are informed by a casual attitude toward civilian death and suffering, 
nor does it suggest that drone operators themselves are unaware or unconcerned 
with the ethical implications of drone strikes: a 2011 report commissioned by the 
Department of Defense stated that 17% of drone pilots show signs of “clinical 
distress” due in part to the trauma of “pressing a button that can lead to 
someone’s death half a world away.”205 The report also referred to high operation 
stress due to a shortage of qualified drone operators, long and odd hours, short 
staffing, and monotony, which in combination led to fatigue and “burnout.”206 
The quotes from the authors above are included because they are good examples 
of common, pro-drone-strike arguments held by scholars, political commentators, 
and military officials alike.207 However, it is pertinent to note that other law 
professors and legal commentators are similarly interested in drones’ purported 
ability to minimize injury and psychological trauma to American forces and 
effectively carry out missions against Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups.208 
That all said, these arguments do not necessarily rest on stable ground.209 
First, the targeted killing of Al-Qaeda members who have a continuous combat 
function is generally permissible under IHL.210 But, as discussed at length, Al-
Qaeda fighters are not the only people targeted by drone strikes.211 A study by 
Stanford Law School and New York University’s School of Law concluded the 
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number of “high-level” targets killed as a percentage of total casualties was 
extremely low, about two-percent.212 The militant-to-target ratio, furthermore, is 
difficult to verify given that military-aged males in the strike zone are often 
counted as “militants;” so too are affiliates of Al-Qaeda or the Taliban.213 It is, 
however, clear from witness statements, as well as from statements made by 
drone operators themselves, that the signature strike protocol has led to the 
deaths of civilians, including women and children: “I saw men, women and 
children die . . . . I never thought I would kill that many people. In fact, I thought 
I couldn’t kill anyone at all,”214 Brandon Bryant, a former drone operator with the 
U.S. Air Force, told Der Spiegel.215 On one occasion, in October of 2010, sixty-
nine children were killed when a drone strike hit a religious seminary in 
Chenegai, in Bajaur Agency.216 The target was apparently the headmaster, who 
was a “known militant.”217 The Pakistan army initially took responsibility for the 
strike, and it is still not clear why the school was targeted when so many children 
were inside it.218 It is therefore difficult to claim that drones are inherently more 
likely to adhere to IHL by virtue of their enhanced technical capabilities.219 
Second, “the longer loiter time of drones” which, according to Professor 
Lewis, “allows for a much higher level of confidence that the target has been 
properly identified,”220 does not speak to the criteria for properly identifying 
appropriate targets.221 According to comments made by an anonymous official to 
the Washington Post in 2011, for example, two times as many “wanted terrorists” 
have been killed by the United States in signature strikes than in personality 
strikes.222 Additionally, those individuals on the kill list have been killed by a 
signature strike “when the [CIA] didn’t know they were there.”223 
Of course, if the definition of a militant’s “signature” reliably and 
consistently overlapped with IHL’s definition of “direct participation” or 
“continuous combat function,” Professor Lewis would have a point. However, as 
discussed, there are indications that that a “signature” is not a reliable proxy for 
distinction.224 A drone may be able to hit its target with more accuracy than a 
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traditional, staffed aircraft;225 however, the target itself may not be a legal one 
under IHL.226 
Supporters of drone strikes also frequently tout the “accuracy” of drones, 
arguing that they are an ideal weapon for minimizing civilian casualties.227 Vogel 
writes: 
With their ability to surveil for hours or days at a time, and to perform 
surgical strikes with pinpoint accuracy, drones typically offer a cleaner 
alternative to other forms of aerial bombardment or missile strikes. P.W. 
Singer writes that “[u]nmanned systems seem to offer several ways of 
reducing the mistakes and unintended costs of war,” including by using 
“far better sensors and processing power . . . allow[ing] decisions to be 
made in a more deliberate manner,” and “remov[ing] the anger and 
emotion from the humans behind them.” “Such exactness,” Singer 
argues, “can lessen the number of mistakes made, as well as the number 
of civilians inadvertently killed.” Senior U.S. officials have consistently 
stated that “procedures and practices for identifying lawful targets” in the 
AUMF conflict “are extremely robust, and advanced technologies have 
helped to make our targeting even more precise.”228 
By and large, the mainstream media have agreed with this narrative, 
characterizing drones as offering “pinpoint accuracy”229 in the field. Again, as it 
is difficult to know exactly how many civilians have been killed in drone strikes, 
it is difficult to assess the veracity of claims regarding drones’ target finding 
capabilities.230 Counterterrorism advisor John Brennan stated in 2011 that “there 
hasn’t been a single collateral death,”231 but in April of 2013, Brennan admitted: 
“[civilians] have been accidentally injured, or worse, killed in these strikes. It is 
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exceedingly rare, but it has happened. When it does, it pains us, and we regret it 
deeply, as we do any time innocents are killed in war.”232 
Pakistan’s Interior Minister, Rehman Malik, has disputed the latter assertion, 
saying that only 20% of drone strike victims are in fact militants, and the rest are 
civilians.233 A leaked Pakistani government document puts the number of civilian 
deaths far lower than Rehman Malik’s 80% but far higher than Brennan’s 
assertion of 0%, finding that 20% of the people killed between 2006 and 2009 
were civilians.234 
Whatever the real civilian death toll, “surgical strike,” like “pinpoint 
accuracy,” is a term with no real substance and no connection to observable or 
measurable data.235 It has never been seriously claimed that a drone can fire a 
HELLFIRE missile at a pin from 15,000 feet and hit it with any degree of 
consistency. These terms—“surgical strike” and “pinpoint accuracy”—therefore 
either do not mean anything concrete and do not tell us anything useful, or 
alternatively, are to be taken at face value and are plainly wrong. 
Furthermore, “accuracy” and “precision” are not synonyms: it is possible for 
a weapon to be accurate but not precise, or precise but not accurate.236 
“Accuracy” describes the closeness of a drone strike to its chosen target.237 
“Precision” refers to how close drone strikes fall to each other when aimed at a 
single target.238 For example, if five HELLFIRE missiles are launched one after 
the other and all fall on the same spot, the HELLFIRE missile can be called 
“precise.”239 If that spot, however, is nowhere near the designated target, the 
HELLFIRE missiles are not “accurate.”240 If the HELLFIRE missile in this 
scenario truly is both accurate and precise, all five missiles would form a tight 
cluster around the designated target.241 
Unfortunately, the HELLFIRE missile may be neither accurate nor precise, 
as suggested by a Pentagon report on the AGM-114 HELLFIRE missile.242 
Developed in the 1970s, the HELLFIRE is designed to defeat tanks “and other 
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individual targets”243 and “hosts precision kill technology against high-value 
armour, air defense, ship, waterborne, and non-moving targets.”244 An archived 
U.S. Navy Fact File page from 2002 describes it in similar terms, highlighting its 
efficiency in destroying tanks, helicopters, and slow-moving aircraft: 
HELLFIRE can be used as an air-to-air or an air-to-ground missile. The 
Air-to-Ground (AGM)-114 provides precision striking power against 
tanks, structures, bunkers and helicopters. The HELLFIRE missile is 
capable of defeating any known tank in the world today. It can be guided 
to the target either from inside the aircraft or by lasers outside the 
aircraft.245 
The most recent upgrade, the Romeo II, is tested on stationary targets sitting 
in the open in a flat test range at an Air Force base in Florida and is yielding 
inflated numbers regarding both the accuracy and precision of the weapon.246 The 
Brookings Institution estimated in a 2009 report that a HELLFIRE missile killed 
ten civilians for each “militant.”247 This could serve either as an indictment of 
signature strike protocol or alternatively suggest that the HELLFIRE (which, was 
originally designed for engagement with tanks and tank-sized targets) is not 
“pinpoint accurate” when fired at humans.248 
The “double tap,” wherein the drone operator fires at an intended target, and 
then at rescuers offering assistance to any survivors, may have in fact been 
initiated at the suggestion of Lockheed-Martin as a way to compensate for the 
inaccuracy of HELLFIRE missiles.249 In the “double tap” method, missiles strike 
the initial target, and then strike rescuers and medical personnel who arrive at the 
scene to offer assistance.250 According to a recent report that makes use of on-the-
ground investigative reporting and eye-witness interviews, the double-tap has 
been used with growing frequency in Afghanistan and Pakistan to the point that 
“almost every other” strike in certain regions of Pakistan is a double tap.251 
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The effect of the double tap on civilians has been profound.252 In addition to 
adding to the mounting death toll of non-combatants,253 double taps have 
essentially trained first responders not to assist or rescue drone strike victims and 
to withhold emergency services and medical help from survivors: 
A father of four, who lost one of his legs in a drone strike, admitted: 
“[w]e and other people are so scared of drone attacks now that when 
there is a drone strike, for two or three hours nobody goes close to [the 
location of the strike]. We don’t know who [the victims] are, whether 
they are young or old, because we try to be safe.”254 
At this point, it is not clear if the “double tap” falls under the umbrella of 
signature strike protocol.255 It is, however, clear that the double tap violates 
specific protections in place for the “sick, wounded . . . [and] others such as 
medical and religious personnel, humanitarian workers, and civil defense 
staff.”256 A 2007 Homeland Security Report referred to the double tap as a 
“favorite tactic of Hamas” and one employed by “terrorists,”257 and Christof 
Heyns, a U.N. special rapporteur on extrajudicial killings, has characterized 
drone strikes on first responders as a “war crime.”258 
Claims that the drone is an ideal weapon that is more humane due to its 
“accuracy” and “precision” must therefore be subjected to scrutiny, given that the 
facts on the ground seem to tell a very different story.259 
VIII. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
It should be clear at this point that “signatures” are not necessarily an 
accurate proxy for determining direct participation consistent with IHL, and that 
the problematic nature of signature strike protocol may lead to a disproportionate 
number of civilian deaths.260 It should also be clear that the unpredictability of 
signature drone strikes has put local civilian populations in a state of terror, 
which may not be illegal under IHL, but certainly compromises the stated goal of 
winning over hearts and minds.261 
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We did not know that America existed. We did not know what its 
geographical location was, how its government operated, what its 
government was like, until America invaded Iraq and Afghanistan. We 
do know that Americans supported the Taliban in our area, North 
Waziristan, to fight off the Soviets. But [now with] the Soviets divided 
and broken . . . we have become victims of Americans. We don’t know 
how they treat their citizens or anything about them. All we know is that 
they used to support us, and now they don’t. . . . [W]e didn’t know how 
they treated a common man. Now we know how they treat a common 
man, what they’re doing to us.262 
There are several possibilities that can explain the unpredictability of 
signature drone strikes.263 The first is that signature strike protocol is 
underdeveloped, giving it an improvisatory and therefore unpredictable nature.264 
Drone operators and their supervisors may be left to their own devices to figure 
out what behaviors merit the lethal use of force, and assessment of such 
behaviors may vary from operator to operator, or even from shift to shift.265 The 
risk, however, is that the improvisatory nature of such protocol becomes 
codified: drone operators may conclude regularly that driving in convoy, for 
example, is suspicious.266 Administration officials may then infer from the fact 
that drone strikes have often killed military-aged males traveling in convoys that 
terrorists or combatants are more likely than others to drive in a convoy.267 As 
time passes, driving in a convoy may join an official list of behaviors deemed 
suspicious.268 
Another possibility, however, is that the protocol itself is designed to target 
terrorists rather than combatants, and that there is not enough of an overlap 
between the two to effectively and consistently distinguish them.269 The overlap 
between the day-to-day life of a terrorist and the day-to-day life of a civilian, as 
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noted, may be profound given that a drone operator is not privy to cultural 
context.270 As a result, civilians are often mistakenly targeted.271 
This leads us to a final possibility, which is that signature strike protocol 
conforms in theory with IHL, but in practice is difficult to apply due to cultural 
misunderstandings.272 Drone operators and their supervisors may simply not be 
exposed to enough cultural material to understand which practices are 
commonplace in a given strike zone, and which are indeed suspicious, out of the 
ordinary, or consistent with terrorists’ behavior.273 
Whatever the case, it is clear from eye-witness reports and on-the-ground 
reporting that signature drone strike protocol requires revisiting and fine-tuning, 
as it may be in violation of several aspects of IHL.274 
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